Lebanon is currently experiencing a nationwide economic collapse which has followed from political turmoil at the end of 2019. Layered with the pre-existing vulnerabilities present within the country, the situation is now threatening basic food security of the population, exacerbating protection needs and eroding access to basic services, particularly for vulnerable girls and boys.
Pre-collapse context
Lebanon has been host to the highest numbers of refugees per capita than any other country in the region. The current total population stands at 6.8 Million[1]. Of that figure, 1.5 million are Syrian refugees and 270,000 Palestinian refugees[2]. More than 55 percent of Syrian refugees are children. 45 percent of Palestinian refugees live in the country’s 12 formal camps, and 268,582 Syrian refugees reside in Informal Settlements. Such conditions result in overcrowding, poor access to basic services and major protection concerns. Governmental refugee policies have been strict and the Government stance on Syrian refugees has become increasingly hostile, with refugees only able to work in three economic sectors, limited access to legal residency, restriction in free travel and limited access to formal education and healthcare.
Lebanon remains resource scarce, relying heavily on imports and unable to extend basic services to the Lebanese population (including electricity, water, health services, food security and employment), due to lack of sufficient Governmental services (hindered by political parties ongoing rivalry and a large budget deficit).
Internal economic and political decisions made in the 1990s following the civil war laid the foundations for the collapse that is happening currently. The pegging of the Lebanese Pound to the dollar in 1997 has taken significant central reserve funding to keep it afloat. Supported through the banking system’s strong dependency on dollar deposits secured through provision of high interest rates, chronic commercial deficits and the Government of Lebanon’s continued reliance on large numbers of Lebanese diaspora supplying foreign currency into the country, have all created economic instability. All the while the Government of Lebanon operated with an estimated 155 percent of national debt against gross domestic product.
Ongoing uncontrolled collapse
An economic downturn in such a market with the continued use of central reserves to keep the dollar afloat increased the Government budget deficit all of which resulted in the lowest GDP per capita in 2019 since 2008. A shortage of dollars in late 2019 led to an emerging black market in which the Lebanese Pound has been severely devalued. In response, the Government opted to call for increased taxes on gas, tobacco and taxes placed on WhatsApp calls (and other media forums) in October 2019. Public response was to call for protests which gathered quickly and spread across the country as a stand against the Lebanese Government for the long standing issues mentioned above as well as corruption within the public sector and sectarianism..
Following public demands, Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned and the former Education Minister took over the role with the clear task of forming a new government. Protesters continued to speak out against the Government but failed to prevent the formal appointment of a new government, with the backing of Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement and other prominent parties.
COVID-19 reached Lebanon in February 2020, resulting in lock downs, accelerated mass unemployment and closure of small and medium businesses, all of which escalated impending economic collapse. The medium term prognosis for the secondary impact of COVID is bleak.
Between the protests and COVID (October 2019 to April 2020), the WFP recorded a 56 percent increase in prices of food. With 80 percent of the country's food needs relying on imports, this figure can only be expected to rise. Fifty percent of Lebanese, 63 percent of Palestinians and 75 percent of Syrians felt worried they would not have enough food to eat over the past month (June, 2020).
Lebanon is also home to approximately 250,000 migrant workers, who are particularly vulnerable during this time and often excluded from existing humanitarian programs.
Between the economic collapse, the pre-existing vulnerabilities and the compounding effects of COVID-19, increasing numbers of refugees, vulnerable Lebanese and migrant workers are requiring humanitarian assistance.
There are four population groups likely to be the most affected:
- Previously and newly vulnerable Lebanese
- Families and individuals who previously wouldn’t have been classed as living in poverty or food insecure are now rising (please see impact on basic services section). The middle class in Lebanon are now living in poverty and those already considered poor are further impoverished.
- Syrian refugees (1.5 Million, 55 percent of which are children)
- Already vulnerable and now increasingly so Palestinian refugees (270,000) and Palestinian refugees from Syria (approximately 30,000), with 50 percent under the age of 24 years.
Also already vulnerable and now increasingly so.
- Migrant workers (250,000 people), that are mostly hired through the inherently prejudice Kafala system from Ethiopia, Philippines, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and are in an increasingly precarious situation as their employers cannot afford to keep them and they have limited rights or ability to fly home.
The economic collapse, due to its severity, will affect the whole of Lebanon, some areas will potentially be worse than others and require more specialised interventions if vulnerability was high there prior to the economic downturn, but the country at large will remain affected and additional layer of COVID will only exemplify some of the issues. Here, Humanitarian Advisors will look at a few key issues:
Food insecurity:
Food insecurity has been reported in all eight governorates, but increasingly so in Baalbek, Akkar and the North which have been the areas with the highest poverty rates within Lebanon. They are also the areas with the highest rates of Syrian refugees due to their proximity to the Lebanon/Syrian border. 43 percent of Lebanese, 53 percent of Palestinians and 46 percent of Syrians surveyed[3] stated they were eating less expensive meals and less preferred food items. Families with at least one child were reporting resorting to severe coping strategies.
Unemployment/Poverty:
Dramatic increase in poverty is expected across all population groups, with figures ranging 50 percent of Lebanese expected to be living in poverty, 70 percent of Palestinians and 90 percent of Syrians[4]. For vulnerable Lebanese the rise of poverty is shockingly fast, as in September 2019 the poverty rate was only 33 percent.
Syrian refugees have been hit hard by the declining economy, half of all Syrian refugee families survive on less than $2.9 per person per day and 88 percent are in debt[5], meaning they are more likely to have resorted to negative coping mechanisms during the economic struggles.
A WFP study shows that Lebanese women as well as young adults between 25-34 years of age have been particularly affected by reduced salaries. Drastic change in employment status was significantly felt more by Syrian women than men, as 61 percent reported losing their jobs due to COVID-19 compared to 46 percent of Syrian men. One in four Syrian refugees have already exhausted their coping capacity, followed by one in five Palestinians and 12 percent of Lebanese (June 2020).
An ILO study on migrant workers in May 2020 showed that 79 percent of respondents reported having no source of income of which 47 percent lost since the start of the Economic Crisis in 2019 and 32 percent lost after the COVID-19 lockdown began.
Child Protection:
Risks are expected to increase including child marriage and child labour, as families struggle to meet their basic needs. Most recent figures from WFP[6] study estimating 12 percent of Syrian children engaged in some form of work, but due to under reporting the actual figure is expected to be much higher. Violence in schools, the community and at home, is likely to increase as additional stress is places on caregivers due to unemployment, food insecurity and risk of conflict in Lebanon.
Education:
Access to education even prior to the situation escalating differed amongst the population groups. In 2019, UNHCR identified 483,000 school aged children amongst the Syrian refugee population, and over half, 320,000 are not in formal education. Those who are in formal education attend ‘second shift’ public schools, where school dropout is common. Barriers to education include the financial implications related to fees, educational materials and transport costs, lack of official documentation, lack of school capacity and imposed limitations on movement, which results in fear of crossing checkpoints.
Palestinian children access education through UNWRA schools, but the quality of teaching is low and the protection risks within UNWRA schools are high.
Previously, only 30 percent of Lebanese are in the public school system (70 percent attend private or hybrid schools), which is indictative of major quality and protection concerns about the public school system. It is expected that this school year will see a huge influx of Lebanese students in the public system, as their families cannot afford private education, putting huge strain on the system.
Dropping out of education is common and expected to increase in an environment with minimal protection measures, especially for girls. Before the crisis SC was supporting the Ministry to roll out child protection policy in public schools, but this has since been suspended due to competing government priorities.
In addition, COVID-19 challenges have meant that children have been unable to finish their school year and continue to face uncertainty as to whether they can continue in the next year. Currently over half of Syrian refugee children (320,000) are enrolled in any learning, a situation that is likely to worsen as competition for public school places increases as Lebanese families withdraw their children from private schools. The level of protection and quality within public schools is also expected to decrease as government funds are limited. With increase in poverty, school drop outs as expected to increase as children are engaged in work.
Access to Health:
Access to health has always been a challenge among refugee populations due to inaccessibility of clinics and clinics not supporting non Lebanese populations. 82 percent of healthcare in Lebanon is delivered through private hospitals which remains unaffordable to most. The devaluation of the currency has already contributed to challenges in importing medicines. In May alone, 56 percent of Lebanese respondents reported facing challenges in accessing medicine, while 71 percent of Palestinians and 73 percent of Syrians reported encountering challenges.[7]
The increase in unemployment and as a result the rise in poverty levels will also see many families being forced to use severe coping strategies in order to purchase medicine, particularly for chronic illnesses.
GBV:
Tensions and violence have also been reported to be on the rise, especially by the Lebanese population compared to other groups. More Lebanese women (56 percent) have perceived tensions than men (52 percent). In addition, Lebanese women are perceiving a greater increase in domestic violence compared to men, which raises important protection concerns (WFP, 2020).
Shelter:
Evictions are on the increase, particularly among Syrian refugees, with the main cause being inability to pay rent. Much of the refugee population in Lebanon already live in sub-standard buildings, including 20 percent in informal settlements, and 24 percent in non-residential buildings.
[1] https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/lebanon-population/
[2] https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon
[3] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000116784/download/
[4] Lebanese 50% (World Bank); Syrian 90% (Business Continuity Plan of Basic Assistance Working Group); for Palestinian 70% (UNWRA)
[5] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71
[6] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000116784/download/
[7] https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000116784/download/
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