For most humanitarian actors in Syria, the long and painful Syrian conflict divides into three operational areas: north west Syria (NWS), comprising opposition-held Idlib province and the northern Aleppo countryside; north east Syria (NES), the territory north of the Euphrates River administered by Kurdish officials; and south central Syria, which encompasses the areas under the control of the government of Syria. The dynamics in each are distinct, yet interrelated through the overarching forces at play in the whole of Syria.  Since the outset, the Syrian conflict has been steered by regional forces. Syria in 2020 continues to be shaped in large part by the give-and-take of these forces—the tussle of regional relationships.

Russia and Iranian influence in Syria

Over the course of the war, GoS has depended on Russia & Iran—first for support, then for survival. The Government of Iran (GoI) has provided an economic lifeline to the government in Damascus in the form of massive loans for fuel, medicine, food, and other essentials. Like Russia, Iranian  military expertise was essential in turning the tide in 2015 when it appeared GoS was facing defeat and the repeated and overt human rights violations in Syria do not appear to have dampened the relationship. Though GoI and the Government of Russia (GoR) pursue the same overarching goal in Syria—preservation of the Syrian state under the leadership of President Assad—the two governments have different and sometimes clashing interests inside Syria. In general, GoR wishes to create a sturdy, hierarchical state that will serve as a dependable client for the long-term. GoI, on the other hand, is content to exploit the instability of the state, entrenching friendly militia in strategic areas, often disconnected from Damascus’ goals. As a result, there is an ongoing struggle for influence within key institutions and for key resources. In 2020, it will be important to follow how these two visions clash, especially in the South, where GoI’s aim to bolster Hezbollah clashes with GoR’s aim to unify all armed actors under a single banner.

Turkey's influence in Syria

As GoS seeks to regain territory and reconcile opponents, it is GoR that directs the firepower and sets the pace of this advance. If GoS could call the shots, GoR would press forward with an unrelenting campaign to recapture the entirety of Syrian territory. But GoR has to balance this imperative with its strategic relationship with the government of Turkey (GoT). The GoR-GoT portfolio is broad—including seemingly far-flung situations such as the war in Libya, drilling rights in the Mediterranean, conflict in Azerbaijan, and NATO politics—meaning that decisions about NWS and NES are taken in tandem with considerations outside of Syria. And so GoT’s core interests in Syria—preventing further cross-border migration, maintaining influence within its three zones of control, and degrading Kurdish military ability—are juggled with its other regional interests. Likewise, inside Syria, because GoT and GoR are the principal regional players in both NWS and NES, actions in each area are sometimes taken to influence behavior in the other. For example, GoR can use the threat of forcing refugees to the Turkish border in NWS to temper GoT’s ambitions for the M4 or Manbij in NES. The bottom line is that fates of NWS and NES in 2020 are—to a considerable degree— tethered to negotiations between Moscow and Ankara.

The US and Syria

The regional confrontation between the US and Iran is a primary  motivating factor for US military presence in NES. The Iraqi-Syrian border crossing at Qaim/Bukamel is a major conduit for Iranian-aligned militia and weaponry traveling west toward Lebanon and Israel. As such, the area will likely remain a volatile, contested space for years. The second motivation for US presence is the ongoing fight against the resurgent remnants of ISIS. This fighting, in partnership with the Kurdish-led Syrian Defense Forces (SDF), is active mostly in Arab tribal regions in southern NES, and often complicates Kurdish-Arab relations.

Economic challenges in Lebanon spread

The Syrian economy is deeply entwined with Lebanon’s. Throughout the war, as the vice of sanctions constricted Syrian markets, Lebanon served as an important conduit for dollars and dollar-based commodities. This stream has dried up as Lebanon faces its own dollar shortage. The Lebanese crisis has dragged the Syrian currency to historic lows, affecting the purchasing power of millions of vulnerable Syrians, and has squeezed the ability of Syrians living in Lebanon to send the remittances that
many families in Syria depend upon. Following the August explosion at the Port of Beirut, it is inevitable that Lebanon’s economy will sink further.

Syria is currently gripped by an all-pervasive economic crisis. The currency has fallen dramatically against the dollar, eviscerating savings and purchasing power. More than 85 percent of Syrians now live beneath the poverty line. Food prices have doubled in most areas and, as the availability of subsidized bread diminishes, more families are slipping into food insecurity and malnutrition. Two-thirds of all employed people in government-held areas hold state jobs where the average monthly salary now amounts to about $20. The economic crisis touches on all aspects of life and shows little sign of relenting in the medium term.

The failing economy and the Coronavirus pandemic are accelerating the
deterioration of the state. It is no longer a functioning state that provides services or protection to its citizens, but a network of political actors clinging to the remnants of the government, extracting profits where available. Current priorities were on display in recent parliamentary elections, when the ruling party removed long-standing loyalists and replaced them with the warlords and war profiteers who are key to the ruling elite’s survival. Even if the war were to stop tomorrow, there would be a years-long road ahead for state reconstruction.

North West Syria

NWS can be divided roughly into two distinct zones: Idlib, often referred to as the last holdout of the armed opposition, and Rif Aleppo, the countryside north of Aleppo, often referred to by its most prominent cities, Azaz, Afrin, and Jarablus. Both zones fall within Turkey’s sphere of influence.

Idlib exists in a precarious situation. The area is under pressure both externally and internally. A ceasefire between GoR and GoT paused fighting on the frontline in early March. One of the conditions of the ceasefire is that GoT clear Idlib of “terrorists”—and indeed GoT has its own interests to “moderate” Idlib into a space that it can better control. At the same time, the predominant local military actor, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a radical jihadist group who govern most of Idlib through their Salvation Government (SG), have begun to eliminate their local rivals—armed radical groups such as Hurras al-Din. It is unclear to what degree this infighting is a turf war, or a directive of GoT, or a combination of both. The SG has low popularity in many areas and is subject to regular protests over services and policies.

Rif Aleppo is controlled by the Syrian National Army (SNA), an umbrella of several dozen militia supported by GoT. Politically, the area is administered by local committees, directed by GoT. Rif Aleppo has a higher standard of living than Idlib, and higher rents is one key factor why more impoverished IDPs resettle in Idlib. Security services in the area are only semi-professional, leading to constant reports of extortion and mistreatment.

Following the US repositioning and subsequent Turkish incursion in October 2019, Kurdish military forces (SDF) entered into a military agreement with GoS. What has yet to take shape is the political corollary. At the moment, Kurdish officials recognize President Assad as the lawful ruler of Syria, but de facto administrative authority is still held by the Kurdish Self Administration (SA). In the long-term, GoS envisions a complete takeover of NES, but its resources are stretched too thin to assert itself now, especially as the campaign in Idlib remains the principal military priority. Furthermore, for GoS and GoR, Kurdish forces provide an important counterweight to Turkish expansionary ambitions, and GoR views the Kurdish SA as a stable actor and key partner in Syria’s most resource-rich region. Recent agreements between the US and Kurdish officials to develop oil resources indicate that the US is committed to the area for at least the medium term.

Following the defeat of its “caliphate” in early 2019, ISIS has reemerged as a dangerous underground actor across central Syria. The group’s current stronghold is in the Badia desert, where it profits from controlling cross-line smuggling routes. To deter patrolling of its stronghold, ISIS has conducted an increasing number of attacks on SDF and GoS forces across Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, northern Homs, and eastern Hama. The current trajectory indicates the group is gaining in strength and capability.

South Central Syria

In the summer of 2018, GoS reconquered the southern governorates through a combination of military force and reconciliation agreements. These agreements brought relative stability for a time, but state neglect, reneged  reconciliation promises, the halting of cross border international aid, and an ailing economy undermined any chance for durable peace. The security environment, which deteriorated significantly over 2019, is deeply fragmented, with armed control changing from one village to the next. In 2020, GoR has made progress to bring political and security actors under a single tent, but these efforts—sometimes sabotaged by other GoS-aligned actors—has a long and uncertain road ahead.